belonged to it properly. Mr. Barnstaple’s mind leapt

[1] He had no models before him, for such earlier writings as the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius and the autobiographical sections in Hilary of Poitiers and Cyprian of Carthage have only to be compared with the Confessions to see how different they are. [2] Gen. 1:1. [3] Gen. 2:2. [4] Notice the echo here of Acts 9:1. [5] Ps. 100:3. [6] Cf. Ps. 145:3 and Ps. 147:5. [7] Rom. 10:14. [8] Ps. 22:26. [9] Matt. 7:7. [10] A reference to Bishop Ambrose of Milan; see Bk. V, Ch. XIII; Bk. VIII, Ch. 11, 3. [11] Ps. 139:8. [12] Jer. 23:24. [13] Cf. Ps. 18:31. [14] Ps. 35:3. [15] Cf. Ps. 19:12, 13. [16] Ps. 116:10. [17] Cf. Ps. 32:5. [18] Cf. Job 9:2. [19] Ps. 130:3. [20] Ps. 102:27. [21] Ps. 102:27. [22] Cf. Ps. 92:1. [23] Cf. Ps. 51:5. [24] In baptism which, Augustine believed, established the effigiem Christi in the human soul. [25] Cf. Ps. 78:39. [26] Cf. Ps. 72:27. [27] Aeneid, VI, 457 [28] Cf. Aeneid, II. [29] Lignum is a common metaphor for the cross; and it was often joined to the figure of Noah's ark, as the means of safe transport from earth to heaven. [30] This apostrophe to "the torrent of human custom" now switches its focus to the poets who celebrated the philanderings of the gods; see De civ. Dei, II, vii-xi; IV, xxvi-xxviii. [31] Probably a contemporary disciple of Cicero (or the Academics) whom Augustine had heard levy a rather common philosopher's complaint against Olympian religion and the poetic myths about it. Cf. De Labriolle, I, 21 (see Bibl.). [32] Terence, Eunuch., 584-591; quoted again in De civ. Dei, II, vii. [33] Aeneid, I, 38. [34] Cf. Ps. 103:8 and Ps. 86:15. [35] Ps. 27:8. [36] An interesting mixed reminiscence of Enneads, I, 5:8 and Luke 15:13-24. [37] Ps. 123:1. [38] Matt. 19:14. [39] Another Plotinian echo; cf. Enneads, III, 8:10. [40] Yet another Plotinian phrase; cf. Enneads, I, 6, 9:1-2. [41] Cf. Gen. 3:18 and De bono conjugali, 8-9, 39-35 (N-PNF, III, 396-413). [42] 1 Cor. 7:28. [43] 1 Cor. 7:1. [44] 1 Cor. 7:32, 33. [45] Cf. Matt. 19:12. [46] Twenty miles from Tagaste, famed as the birthplace of Apuleius, the only notable classical author produced by the province of Africa. [47] Another echo of the De profundis (Ps. 130:1) -- and the most explicit statement we have from Augustine of his motive and aim in writing these "confessions." [48] Cf. 1 Cor. 3:9. [49] Ps. 116:16. [50] Cf. Jer. 51:6; 50:8. [51] Cf. Ps. 73:7. [52] Cicero, De Catiline, 16. [53] Deus summum bonum et bonum verum meum. [54] Avertitur, the opposite of convertitur: the evil will turns the soul _away_ from God; this is sin. By grace it is turned _to_ God; this is _conversion_. [55] Ps. 116:12. [56] Ps. 19:12. [57] Cf. Matt. 25:21. [58] Cf. Job 2:7, 8. [59] 2 Cor. 2:16. [60] Eversores, "overturners," from overtere, to overthrow or ruin. This was the nickname of a gang of young hoodlums in Carthage, made up largely, it seems, of students in the schools. [61] A minor essay now lost. We know of its existence from other writers, but the only fragments that remain are in Augustine's works: Contra Academicos, III, 14:31; De beata vita, X; Soliloquia, I, 17; De civitate Dei, III, 15; Contra Julianum, IV, 15:78; De Trinitate, XIII, 4:7, 5:8; XIV, 9:12, 19:26; Epist. CXXX, 10. [62] Note this merely parenthetical reference to his father's death and contrast it with the account of his mother's death in Bk. IX, Chs. X-XII. [63] Col. 2:8, 9. [64] I.e., Marcus Tullius Cicero. [65] These were the Manicheans, a pseudo-Christian sect founded by a Persian religious teacher, Mani (c. A.D. 216-277). They professed a highly eclectic religious system chiefly distinguished by its radical dualism and its elaborate cosmogony in which good was co-ordinated with light and evil with darkness. In the sect, there was an esoteric minority called perfecti, who were supposed to obey the strict rules of an ascetic ethic; the rest were auditores, who followed, at a distance, the doctrines of the perfecti but not their rules. The chief attraction of Manicheism lay in the fact that it appeared to offer a straightforward, apparently profound and rational solution to the problem of evil, both in nature and in human experience. Cf. H.C. Puech, Le Manicheisme, son fondateur -- sa doctrine (Paris, 1949); F.C. Burkitt, The Religion of the Manichees (Cambridge, 1925); and Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee (Cambridge, 1947). [66] James 1:17. [67] Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, V, 3:14. [68] Cf. Luke 15:16. [69] Cf. Ovid, Metamorphoses, VII, 219-224. [70] For the details of the Manichean cosmogony, see Burkitt, op. cit., ch. 4. [71] Prov. 9:18. [72] Cf. Prov. 9:17; see also Prov. 9:13 (Vulgate text). [73] Cf. Enchiridion, IV. [74] Cf. Matt. 22:37-39. [75] Cf. 1 John 2:16. And see also Bk. X, Chs. XXX-XLI, for an elaborate analysis of them. [76] Cf. Ex. 20:3-8; Ps. 144:9. In Augustine's Sermon IX, he points out that in the Decalogue _three_ commandments pertain to God and _seven_ to men. [77] Acts 9:5. [78] An example of this which Augustine doubtless had in mind is God's command to Abraham to offer up his son Isaac as a human sacrifice. Cf. Gen. 22:1, 2. [79] Electi sancti. Another Manichean term for the perfecti, the elite and "perfect" among them. [80] Ps. 144:7. [81] Dedocere me mala ac docere bona; a typical Augustinian wordplay. [82] Ps. 50:14. [83] Cf. John 6:27. [84] Ps. 74:21. [85] Cf. Ps. 4:2. [86] The rites of the soothsayers, in which animals were killed, for auguries and propitiation of the gods. [87] Cf. Hos. 12:1. [88] Ps. 41:4. [89] John 5:14. [90] Ps. 51:17. [91] Vindicianus; see below, Bk. VII, Ch. VI, 8. [92] James 4:6; 1 Peter 5:5. [93] Rom. 5:5. [94] Cf. Ps. 106:2. [95] Cf. Ps. 42:5; 43:5. [96] Ibid. [97] Cf. Ovid, Tristia, IV, 4:74. [98] Cf. Horace, Ode I, 3:8, where he speaks of Virgil, et serves animae dimidium meae. Augustine's memory changes the text here to dimidium animae suae. [99] 2 Tim. 4:3. [100] Ps. 119:142. [101] Ps. 80:3. [102] That is, our physical universe. [103] Ps. 19:5. [104] John 1:10. [105] De pulchro et apto; a lost essay with no other record save echoes in the rest of Augustine's aesthetic theories. Cf. The Nature of the Good Against the Manicheans, VIII-XV; City of God, XI, 18; De ordine, I, 7:18; II, 19:51; Enchiridion, III, 10; I, 5. [106] Eph. 4:14. [107] Ps. 72:18. [108] Ps. 18:28. [109] John 1:16. [110] John 1:9. [111] Cf. James 1:17. [112] Cf. James 4:6; 1 Peter 5:5. [113] Ps. 78:39. [114] Cf. Jer. 25:10; 33:11; John 3:29; Rev. 18:23. [115] Cf. Ps. 51:8. [116] The first section of the Organon, which analyzes the problem of predication and develops "the ten categories" of essence and the nine "accidents." This existed in a Latin translation by Victorinus, who also translated the Enneads of Plotinus, to which Augustine refers infra, Bk. VIII, Ch. II, 3. [117] Cf. Gen. 3:18. [118] Again, the Prodigal Son theme; cf. Luke 15:13. [119] Cf. Ps. 17:8. [120] Ps. 35:10. [121] Cf. Ps. 19:6. [122] Cf. Rev. 21:4. [123] Cf. Ps. 138:6. [124] Ps. 8:7. [125] Heb. 12:29. [126] An echo of the opening sentence, Bk. I, Ch. I, 1. [127] Cf. 1 Cor. 1:30. [128] Cf. Matt. 22:21. [129] Cf. Rom. 1:21ff. [130] Cf. Rom. 1:23. [131] Cf. Rom. 1:25. [132] Wis. 11:20. [133] Cf. Job 28:28. [134] Eph. 4:13, 14. [135] Ps. 36:23 (Vulgate). [136] Ps. 142:5. [137] Cf. Eph. 2:15. [138] Bk. I, Ch. XI, 17. [139] Cf. Ps. 51:17. [140] A constant theme in The Psalms and elsewhere; cf. Ps. 136. [141] Cf. Ps. 41:4. [142] Cf. Ps 141:3f. [143] Followers of the skeptical tradition established in the Platonic Academy by Arcesilaus and Carneades in the third century B.C. They taught the necessity of suspended judgment in all questions of truth, and would allow nothing more than the consent of probability. This tradition was known in Augustine's time chiefly through the writings of Cicero; cf. his Academica. This kind of skepticism shook Augustine's complacency severely, and he wrote one of his first dialogues, Contra Academicos, in an effort to clear up the problem posed thereby. [144] The Manicheans were under an official ban in Rome. [145] Ps. 139:22. [146] A mixed figure here, put together from Ps. 4:7; 45:7; 104:15; the phrase sobriam vini ebrietatem is almost certainly an echo of a stanza of one of Ambrose's own hymns, Splendor paternae gloriae, which Augustine had doubtless learned in Milan: "Bibamus sobriam ebrietatem spiritus." Cf. W.I. Merrill, Latin Hymns (Boston, 1904), pp. 4, 5. [147] Ps. 119:155. [148] Cf. 2 Cor. 3:6. The discovery of the allegorical method of interpretation opened new horizons for Augustine in Biblical interpretation and he adopted it as a settled principle in his sermons and commentaries; cf. M. Pontet, L'Exegese de Saint Augustin predicateur (Lyons, 1946). [149] Cf. Ps. 71:5. [150] Cf. Ps. 10:1. [151] Cf. Luke 7:11-17. [152] Cf. John 4:14. [153] Rom. 12:11. [154] 2 Tim. 2:15. [155] Cf. Gen. 1:26f. [156] The Church. [157] 2 Cor. 3:6. [158] Another reference to the Academic doctrine of suspendium; cf. Bk. V, Ch. X, 19, and also Enchiridion, VII, 20. [159] Nisi crederentur, omnino in hac vita nihil ageremus, which should be set alongside the more famous nisi crederitis, non intelligetis (Enchiridion, XIII, 14). This is the basic assumption of Augustine's whole epistemology. See Robert E. Cushman, "Faith and Reason in the Thought of St. Augustine," in Church History (XIX, 4, 1950), pp. 271-294. [160] Cf. Heb. 11:6. [161] Cf. Plato, Politicus, 273 D. [162] Alypius was more than Augustine's close friend; he became bishop of Tagaste and was prominent in local Church affairs in the province of Africa. [163] Prov. 9:8. [164] Luke 16:10. [165] Luke 16:11, 12. [166] Cf. Ps. 145:15. [167] Here begins a long soliloquy which sums up his turmoil over the past decade and his present plight of confusion and indecision. [168] Cf. Wis. 8:21 (LXX). [169] Isa. 28:15. [170] Ecclus. 3:26. [171] The normal minimum legal age for marriage was twelve! Cf. Justinian, Institutiones, I, 10:22. [172] Cf. Ps. 33:11. [173] Cf. Ps. 145:15, 16. [174] A variation on "restless is our heart until it comes to find rest in Thee," Bk. I, Ch. I, 1. [175] Isa. 46:4. [176] Thirty years old; although the term "youth" (juventus) normally included the years twenty to forty. [177] Phantasmata, mental constructs, which may be internally coherent but correspond to no reality outside the mind. [178] Echoes here of Plato's Timaeus and Plotinus' Enneads, although with no effort to recall the sources or elaborate the ontological theory. [179] Cf. the famous "definition" of God in Anselm's ontological argument: "that being than whom no greater can be conceived." Cf. Proslogium, II-V. [180] This simile is Augustine's apparently original improvement on Plotinus' similar figure of the net in the sea; Enneads, IV, 3:9. [181] Gen. 25:21 to 33:20. [182] Cf. Job 15:26 (Old Latin version). [183] Cf. Ps. 103:9-14. [184] James 4:6. [185] Cf. John 1:14. [186] It is not altogether clear as to which "books" and which "Platonists" are here referred to. The succeeding analysis of "Platonism" does not resemble any single known text closely enough to allow for identification. The most reasonable conjecture, as most authorities agree, is that the "books" here mentioned were the Enneads of Plotinus, which Marius Victorinus (q.v. infra, Bk. VIII, Ch. II, 3-5) had translated into Latin several years before; cf. M.P. Garvey, St. Augustine: Christian or Neo-Platonist (Milwaukee, 1939). There is also a fair probability that Augustine had acquired some knowledge of the Didaskalikos of Albinus; cf. R.E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937). [187] Cf. this mixed quotation of John 1:1-10 with the Fifth Ennead and note Augustine's identification of Logos, in the Fourth Gospel, with Nous in Plotinus. [188] John 1:11, 12 [189] John 1:13. [190] John 1:14. [191] Phil. 2:6. [192] Phil. 2:7-11. [193] Rom. 5:6; 8:32. [194] Luke 10:21. [195] Cf. Matt. 11:28, 29. [196] Cf. Ps. 25:9, 18. [197] Matt. 11:29. [198] Rom. 1:21, 22. [199] Rom. 1:23. [200] An echo of Porphyry's De abstinentia ab esu animalium. [201] The allegorical interpretation of the Israelites' despoiling the Egyptians (Ex. 12:35, 36) made it refer to the liberty of Christian thinkers in appropriating whatever was good and true from the pagan philosophers of the Greco-Roman world. This was a favorite theme of Clement of Alexandria and Origen and was quite explicitly developed in Origen's Epistle to Gregory Thaumaturgus (ANF, IX, pp. 295, 296); cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, II, 41-42. [202] Cf. Acts 17:28. [203] Cf. Rom. 1:25. [204] Cf. Ps. 39:11. [205] Some MSS. add "immo vero" ("yea, verily"), but not the best ones; cf. De Labriolle, op. cit., I, p. 162. [206] Rom. 1:20. [207] A locus classicus of the doctrine of the privative character of evil and the positive character of the good. This is a fundamental premise in Augustine's metaphysics: it reappears in Bks. XII-XIII, in the Enchiridion, and elsewhere (see note, infra, p. 343). This doctrine of the goodness of all creation is taken up into the scholastic metaphysics; cf. Confessions, Bks. XII- XIII, and Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentes, II: 45. [208] Ps. 148:7-12. [209] Ps. 148:1-5. [210] "The evil which overtakes us has its source in self-will, in the entry into the sphere of process and in the primal assertion of the desire for self-ownership" (Plotinus, Enneads, V, 1:1). [211] "We have gone weighed down from beneath; the vision is frustrated" (Enneads, VI, 9:4). [212] Rom. 1:20. [213] The Plotinian Nous. [214] This is an astonishingly candid and plain account of a Plotinian ecstasy, the pilgrimage of the soul from its absorption in things to its rapturous but momentary vision of the One; cf. especially the Sixth Ennead, 9:3-11, for very close parallels in thought and echoes of language. This is one of two ecstatic visions reported in the Confessions ; the other is, of course, the last great moment with his mother at Ostia (Bk. IX, Ch. X, 23-25). One comes before the "conversion" in the Milanese garden (Bk. VIII, Ch. XII, 28-29); the other, after. They ought to be compared with particular interest in their _similarities_ as well as their significant differences. Cf. also K.E. Kirk, The Vision of God (London, 1932), pp. 319-346. [215] 1 Tim. 2:5. [216] Rom. 9:5. [217] John 14:6. [218] An interesting reminder that the Apollinarian heresy was condemned but not extinct. [219] It is worth remembering that both Augustine and Alypius were catechumens and had presumably been receiving doctrinal instruction in preparation for their eventual baptism and full membership in the Catholic Church. That their ideas on the incarnation, at this stage, were in such confusion raises an interesting problem. [220] Cf. Augustine's The Christian Combat as an example of "the refutation of heretics." [221] Cf. 1 Cor. 11:19. [222] Non peritus, sed periturus essem. [223] Cf. 1 Cor. 3:11f. [224] Rom. 7:22, 23. [225] Rom. 7:24, 25. [226] Cf. Prov. 8:22 and Col. 1:15. Augustine is here identifying the figure of Wisdom in Proverbs with the figure of the Logos in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. In the Arian controversy both these references to God's Wisdom and Word as "created" caused great difficulty for the orthodox, for the Arians triumphantly appealed to them as proof that Jesus Christ was a "creature" of God. But Augustine was a Chalcedonian before Chalcedon, and there is no doubt that he is here quoting familiar Scripture and filling it with the interpretation achieved by the long struggle of the Church to affirm the coeternity and consubstantiality of Jesus Christ and God the Father. [227] Cf. Ps. 62:1, 2, 5, 6. [228] Cf. Ps. 91:13. [229] A figure that compares the dangers of the solitary traveler in a bandit-infested land and the safety of an imperial convoy on a main highway to the capital city. [230] Cf. 1 Cor. 15:9. [231] Ps. 35:10. [232] Cf. Ps. 116:16, 17. [233] Cf. Ps. 8:1. [234] 1 Cor. 13:12. [235] Matt. 19:12. [236] Rom. 1:21. [237] Job 28:28. [238] Prov. 3:7. [239] Rom. 1:22. [240] Col. 2:8. [241] Virgil, Aeneid, VIII, 698. [242] Ps. 144:5. [243] Luke 15:4. [244] Cf. Luke, ch. 15. [245] 1 Cor. 1:27. [246] A garbled reference to the story of the conversion of Sergius Paulus, proconsul of Cyprus, in Acts 13:4-12. [247] 2 Tim. 2:21. [248] Gal. 5:17. [249] The text here is a typical example of Augustine's love of wordplay and assonance, as a conscious literary device: tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere; sed illud placebat et vincebat, hoc libebat et vinciebat. [250] Eph. 5:14. [251] Rom. 7:22-25. [252] The last obstacles that remained. His intellectual difficulties had been cleared away and the intention to become a Christian had become strong. But incontinence and immersion in his career were too firmly fixed in habit to be overcome by an act of conscious resolution. [253] Treves, an important imperial town on the Moselle; the emperor referred to here was probably Gratian. Cf. E.A. Freeman, "Augusta Trevororum," in the British Quarterly Review (1875), 62, pp. 1-45. [254] Agentes in rebus, government agents whose duties ranged from postal inspection and tax collection to espionage and secret police work. They were ubiquitous and generally dreaded by the populace; cf. J.S. Reid, "Reorganization of the Empire," in Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. I, pp. 36-38. [255] The inner circle of imperial advisers; usually rather informally appointed and usually with precarious tenure. [256] Cf. Luke 14:28-33. [257] Eph. 5:8. [258] Cf. Ps. 34:5. [259] Cf. Ps. 6:3; 79:8. [260] This is the famous Tolle, lege; tolle, lege. [261] Doubtless from Ponticianus, in their earlier conversation. [262] Matt. 19:21. [263] Rom. 13:13. [264] Note the parallels here to the conversion of Anthony and the agentes in rebus. [265] Rom. 14:1. [266] Eph. 3:20. [267] Ps. 116:16, 17. [268] An imperial holiday season, from late August to the middle of October. [269] Cf. Ps. 46:10. [270] His subsequent baptism; see below, Ch. VI. [271] Luke 14:14. [272] Ps. 125:3. [273] The heresy of Docetism, one of the earliest and most persistent of all Christological errors. [274] Cf. Ps. 27:8. [275] The group included Monica, Adeodatus (Augustine's fifteen- year-old son), Navigius (Augustine's brother), Rusticus and Fastidianus (relatives), Alypius, Trygetius, and Licentius (former pupils). [276] A somewhat oblique acknowledgment of the fact that none of the Cassiciacum dialogues has any distinctive or substantial Christian content This has often been pointed to as evidence that Augustine's conversion thus far had brought him no farther than to a kind of Christian Platonism; cf. P. Alfaric, L'Evolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1918). [277] The dialogues written during this stay at Cassiciacum: Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, Soliloquia. See, in this series, Vol. VI, pp. 17-63, for an English translation of the Soliloquies. [278] Cf. Epistles II and III. [279] A symbolic reference to the "cedars of Lebanon"; cf. Isa. 2:12-14; Ps. 29:5. [280] There is perhaps a remote connection here with Luke 10:18- 20. [281] Ever since the time of Ignatius of Antioch who referred to the Eucharist as "the medicine of immortality," this had been a popular metaphor to refer to the sacraments; cf. Ignatius, Ephesians 20:2. [282] Here follows (8-11) a brief devotional commentary on Ps. 4. [283] John 7:39. [284] Idipsum -- the oneness and immutability of God. [285] Cf. v. 9. [286] 1 Cor. 15:54. [287] Concerning the Teacher; cf. Vol. VI of this series, pp. 64- 101. [288] This was apparently the first introduction into the West of antiphonal chanting, which was already widespread in the East. Ambrose brought it in; Gregory brought it to perfection. [289] Cf. S. of Sol. 1:3, 4. [290] Cf. Isa. 40:6; 1 Peter 1:24: "All flesh is grass." See Bk. XI, Ch. II, 3. [291] Ecclus. 19:1. [292] 1 Tim. 5:9. [293] Phil. 3:13. [294] Cf. 1 Cor. 2:9. [295] Ps. 36:9. [296] Idipsum. [297] Cf. this report of a "Christian ecstasy" with the Plotinian ecstasy recounted in Bk. VII, Ch. XVII, 23, above. [298] Cf. Wis. 7:21-30; see especially v. 27: "And being but one, she [Wisdom] can do all things: and remaining in herself the same, she makes all things new." [299] Matt. 25:21. [300] 1 Cor. 15:51. [301] Navigius, who had joined them in Milan, but about whom Augustine is curiously silent save for the brief and unrevealing references in De beata vita-, I, 6, to II, 7, and De ordine, I, 2- 3. [302] A.D. 387. [303] Nec omnino moriebatur. Is this an echo of Horace's famous memorial ode, Exegi monumentum aere perennius . . . non omnis moriar? Cf. Odes, Book III, Ode XXX. [304] 1 Tim. 1:5. [305] Cf. this passage, as Augustine doubtless intended, with the story of his morbid and immoderate grief at the death of his boyhood friend, above, Bk. IV, Chs. IV, 9, to VII, 12. [306] Ps. 101:1. [307] Ps. 68:5. [308] Sir Tobie Matthew (adapted). For Augustine's own analysis of the scansion and structure of this hymn, see De musica, VI, 2:2-3; for a brief commentary on the Latin text, see A.S. Walpole, Early Latin Hymns (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 44-49. [309] 1 Cor. 15:22. [310] Matt. 5:22. [311] 2 Cor. 10:17. [312] Rom. 8:34. [313] Cf. Matt. 6:12. [314] Ps. 143:2. [315] Matt. 5:7. [316] Cf. Rom. 9:15. [317] Ps. 119:108. [318] Cf. 1 Cor. 13:12. [319] Eph. 5:27. [320] Ps. 51:6. [321] John 3:21. [322] 1 Cor. 2:11. [323] 1 Cor. 13:7. [324] Ps. 32:1. [325] Ps. 144:7, 8. [326] Cf. Rev. 8:3-5. "And the smoke of the incense with the prayers of the saints went up before God out of the angel's hand" (v. 4). [327] 1 Cor. 2:11. [328] 1 Cor. 13:12. [329] Isa. 58:10. [330] Rom. 1:20. [331] Cf. Rom. 9:15. [332] One of the pre-Socratic "physiologer." Cf. Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods (a likely source for Augustine's knowledge of early Greek philosophy), I, 10: "After Anaximander comes Anaximenes, who taught that the air is God. . . ." [333] An important text for Augustine's conception of sensation and the relation of body and mind. Cf. On Music, VI, 5:10; The Magnitude of the Soul, 25:48; On the Trinity, XII, 2:2; see also F. Coplestone, A History of Philosophy (London, 1950), II, 51-60, and E. Gilson, Introduction a l'etude de Saint Augustin, pp. 74- 87. [334] Rom. 1:20. [335] Reading videnti (with De Labriolle) instead of vident (as in Skutella). [336] Ps. 32:9. [337] The notion of the soul's immediate self-knowledge is a basic conception in Augustine's psychology and epistemology; cf. the refutation of skepticism, Si fallor, sum in On Free Will, II, 3:7; see also the City of God, XI, 26. [338] Again, the mind-body dualism typical of the Augustinian tradition. Cf. E. Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940), pp. 173-188; and E. Gilson, The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure (Sheed & Ward, New York, 1938), ch. XI. [339] Luke 15:8. [340] Cf. Isa. 55:3. [341] Cf. the early dialogue "On the Happy Life" in Vol. I of The Fathers of the Church (New York, 1948). [342] Gal. 5:17. [343] Ps. 42:11. [344] Cf. Enchiridion, VI, 19ff. [345] When he is known at all, God is known as the Self-evident. This is, of course, not a doctrine of innate ideas but rather of the necessity, and reality, of divine illumination as the dynamic source of all our knowledge of divine reality. Cf. Coplestone, op. cit., ch. IV, and Cushman, op. cit. [346] Cf. Wis. 8:21. [347] Cf. Enneads, VI, 9:4. [348] 1 John 2:16. [349] Eph. 3:20. [350] 1 Cor. 15:54. [351] Cf. Matt. 6:34. [352] 1 Cor. 9:27. [353] Cf. Luke 21:34. [354] Cf. Wis. 8:21. [355] Ecclus. 18:30. [356] 1 Cor. 8:8. [357] Phil. 4:11-13. [358] Ps. 103:14. [359] Cf. Gen. 3:19. [360] Luke 15:24. [361] Ecclus. 23:6. [362] Titus 1:15. [363] Rom. 14:20. [364] 1 Tim. 4:4. [365] 1 Cor. 8:8. [366] Cf. Col. 2:16. [367] Rom. 14:3. [368] Luke 5:8. [369] John 16:33. [370] Cf. Ps. 139:16. [371] Cf. the evidence for Augustine's interest and proficiency in music in his essay De musica, written a decade earlier. [372] Cf. 2 Cor. 5:2. [373] Cf. Tobit, chs. 2 to 4. [374] Gen. 27:1; cf. Augustine's Sermon IV, 20:21f. [375] Cf. Gen., ch. 48. [376] Again, Ambrose, Deus, creator omnium, an obvious favorite of Augustine's. See above, Bk. IX, Ch. XII, 32. [377] Ps. 25:15. [378] Ps. 121:4. [379] Ps. 26:3. [380] 1 John 2:16. [381] Cf. Ps. 103:3-5. [382] Cf. Matt. 11:30. [383] 1 Peter 5:5. [384] Cf. Ps. 18:7, 13. [385] Cf. Isa. 14:12-14. [386] Cf. Prov. 27:21. [387] Cf. Ps. 19:12. [388] Cf. Ps. 141:5. [389] Ps. 109:22. [390] Ps. 31:22. [391] Cf. the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, Luke 18:9- 14. [392] Cf. Eph. 2:2. [393] 2 Cor. 11:14. [394] Rom. 6:23. [395] 1 Tim. 2:5. [396] Cf. Rom. 8:32. [397] Phil. 2:6-8. [398] Cf. Ps. 88:5; see Ps. 87:6 (Vulgate). [399] Ps. 103:3. [400] Cf. Rom. 8:34. [401] John 1:14. [402] 2 Cor. 5:15. [403] Ps. 119:18. [404] Col. 2:3. [405] Cf. Ps. 21:27 (Vulgate). [406] In the very first sentence of Confessions, Bk. I, Ch. I. Here we have a basic and recurrent motif of the Confessions from beginning to end: the celebration and praise of the greatness and goodness of God -- Creator and Redeemer. The repetition of it here connects this concluding section of the Confessions, Bks. XI- XIII, with the preceding part. [407] Matt. 6:8. [408] The "virtues" of the Beatitudes, the reward for which is blessedness; cf. Matt. 5:1-11. [409] Ps. 118:1; cf. Ps. 136. [410] An interesting symbol of time's ceaseless passage; the reference is to a water clock (clepsydra). [411] Cf. Ps. 130:1, De profundis. [412] Ps. 74:16. [413] This metaphor is probably from Ps. 29:9. [414] A repetition of the metaphor above, Bk. IX, Ch. VII, 16. [415] Ps. 26:7. [416] Ps. 119:18. [417] Cf. Matt. 6:33. [418] Col. 2:3. [419] Augustine was profoundly stirred, in mind and heart, by the great mystery of creation and the Scriptural testimony about it. In addition to this long and involved analysis of time and creation which follows here, he returned to the story in Genesis repeatedly: e.g., De Genesi contra Manicheos; De Genesi ad litteram, liber imperfectus (both written _before_ the Confessions ); De Genesi ad litteram, libri XII and De civitate Dei, XI-XII (both written _after_ the Confessions ). [420] The final test of truth, for Augustine, is self-evidence and the final source of truth is the indwelling Logos. [421] Cf. the notion of creation in Plato's Timaeus (29D-30C; 48E- 50C), in which the Demiurgos (craftsman) fashions the universe from pre-existent matter and imposes as much form as the Receptacle will receive. The notion of the world fashioned from pre-existent matter of some sort was a universal idea in Greco- Roman cosmology. [422] Cf. Ps. 33:9. [423] Matt. 3:17. [424] Cf. the Vulgate of John 8:25. [425] Cf. Augustine's emphasis on Christ as true Teacher in De Magistro. [426] Cf. John 3:29. [427] Cf. Ps. 103:4, 5 (mixed text). [428] Ps. 104:24. [429] Pleni vetustatis suae. In Sermon CCLXVII, 2 (PL 38, c. 1230), Augustine has a similar usage. Speaking of those who pour new wine into old containers, he says: Carnalitas vetustas est, gratia novitas est, "Carnality is the old nature; grace is the new"; cf. Matt. 9:17. [430] The notion of the eternity of this world was widely held in Greek philosophy, in different versions, and was incorporated into the Manichean rejection of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo which Augustine is citing here. He returns to the question, and his answer to it, again in De civitate Dei, XI, 4-8. [431] The unstable "heart" of those who confuse time and eternity. [432] Cf. Ps. 102:27. [433] Ps. 2:7. [434] Spatium, which means extension either in space or time. [435] The breaking light and the image of the rising sun. [436] Cf. Ps. 139:6. [437] Memoria, contuitus, and expectatio: a pattern that corresponds vaguely to the movement of Augustine's thought in the Confessions: from direct experience back to the supporting memories and forward to the outreach of hope and confidence in God's provident grace. [438] Cf. Ps. 116:10. [439] Cf. Matt. 25:21, 23. [440] Communes notitias, the universal principles of "common sense." This idea became a basic category in scholastic epistemology. [441] Gen. 1:14. [442] Cf. Josh. 10:12-14. [443] Cf. Ps. 18:28. [444] Cubitum, literally the distance between the elbow and the tip of the middle finger; in the imperial system of weights and measures it was 17.5 inches. [445] Distentionem, "spread-out-ness"; cf. Descartes' notion of res extensae, and its relation to time. [446] Ps. 100:3. [447] Here Augustine begins to summarize his own answers to the questions he has raised in his analysis of time. [448] The same hymn of Ambrose quoted above, Bk. IX, Ch. XII, 39, and analyzed again in De musica, VI, 2:2. [449] This theory of time is worth comparing with its most notable restatement in modern poetry, in T.S. Eliot's Four Quartets and especially "Burnt Norton." [450] Ps. 63:3. [451] Cf. Phil. 3:12-14. [452] Cf. Ps. 31:10. [453] Note here the preparation for the transition from this analysis of time in Bk. XI to the exploration of the mystery of creation in Bks. XII and XIII. [454] Celsitudo, an honorific title, somewhat like "Your Highness." [455] Rom. 8:31. [456] Matt. 7:7, 8. [457] Vulgate, Ps. 113:16 (cf. Ps. 115:16, K.J.; see also Ps. 148:4, both Vulgate and K.J.): Caelum caeli domino, etc. Augustine finds a distinction here for which the Hebrew text gives no warrant. The Hebrew is a typical nominal sentence and means simply "The heavens are the heavens of Yahweh"; cf. the Soncino edition of The Psalms, edited by A. Cohen; cf. also R.S.V., Ps. 115:16. The LXX reading seems to rest on a variant Hebrew text. This idiomatic construction does not mean "the heavens of the heavens" (as it is too literally translated in the LXX), but rather "highest heaven." This is a familiar way, in Hebrew, of emphasizing a superlative (e.g., "King of kings," "Song of songs"). The singular thing can be described superlatively only in terms of itself! [458] Earth and sky. [459] It is interesting that Augustine should have preferred the invisibilis et incomposita of the Old Latin version of Gen. 1:2 over the inanis et vacua of the Vulgate, which was surely accessible to him. Since this is to be a key phrase in the succeeding exegesis this reading can hardly have been the casual citation of the old and familiar version. Is it possible that Augustine may have had the sensibilities and associations of his readers in mind -- for many of them may have not known Jerome's version or, at least, not very well? [460] Abyssus, literally, the unplumbed depths of the sea, and as a constant meaning here, "the depths beyond measure." [461] Gen. 1:2. [462] Augustine may not have known the Platonic doctrine of nonbeing (cf. Sophist, 236C-237B), but he clearly is deeply influenced here by Plotinus; cf. Enneads, II, 4:8f., where matter is analyzed as a substratum without quantity or quality; and 4:15: "Matter, then, must be described as toapeiron (the indefinite). . . . Matter is indeterminateness and nothing else." In short, materia informis is sheer possibility; not anything and not nothing! [463] Dictare: was Augustine dictating his Confessions? It is very probable. [464] Visibiles et compositas, the opposite of "invisible and unformed." [465] Isa. 6:3; Rev. 4:8. [466] De nihilo. [467] Trina unitas. [468] Cf. Gen. 1:6. [469] Constat et non constat, the created earth really exists but never is self-sufficient. [470] Moses. [471] Ps. 42:3, 10. [472] Cor. 13:12. [473] Cf. Ecclus. 1:4. [474] 2 Cor. 5:21. [475] Cf. Gal. 4:26. [476] 2 Cor. 5:1. [477] Cf. Ps. 26:8. [478] Ps. 119:176. [479] To "the house of God." [480] Cf. Ps. 28:1. [481] Cubile, i.e., the heart. [482] Cf. Rom. 8:26. [483] The heavenly Jerusalem of Gal. 4:26, which had become a favorite Christian symbol of the peace and blessedness of heaven; cf. the various versions of the hymn "Jerusalem, My Happy Home" in Julian's Dictionary of Hymnology, pp. 580-583. The original text is found in the Liber meditationum, erroneously ascribed to Augustine himself. [484] Cf. 2 Tim. 2:14. [485] 1 Tim. 1:5. [486] This is the basis of Augustine's defense of allegory as both legitimate and profitable in the interpretation of Scripture. He did not mean that there is a plurality of literal truths in Scripture but a multiplicity of perspectives on truth which amounted to different levels and interpretations of truth. This gave Augustine the basis for a positive tolerance of varying interpretations which did hold fast to the essential common premises about God's primacy as Creator; cf. M. Pontet, L'Exegese de Saint Augustin predicateur (Lyons, 1944), chs. II and III. [487] In this chapter, Augustine summarizes what he takes to be the Christian consensus on the questions he has explored about the relation of the intellectual and corporeal creations. [488] Cf. 1 Cor. 8:6. [489] Mole mundi. [490] Cf. Col. 1:16. [491] Gen. 1:9. [492] Note how this reiterates a constant theme in the Confessions as a whole; a further indication that Bk. XII is an integral part of the single whole. [493] Cf. De libero arbitrio, II, 8:20, 10:28. [494] Cf. John 8:44. [495] The essential thesis of the De Magistro; it has important implications both for Augustine's epistemology and for his theory of Christian nurture; cf. the De catechizandis rudibus. [496] 1 Cor. 4:6. [497] Cf. Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18; see also Matt. 22:37, 39. [498] Cf. Rom. 9:21. [499] Cf. Ps. 8:4. [500] "In the beginning God created," etc. [501] An echo of Job 39:13-16. [502] The thicket denizens mentioned above. [503] Cf. Ps. 143:10. [504] Something of an understatement! It is interesting to note that Augustine devotes more time and space to these opening verses of Genesis than to any other passage in the entire Bible -- and he never commented on the _full_ text of Genesis. Cf. Karl Barth's 274 pages devoted to Gen., chs. 1;2, in the Kirchliche Dogmatik, III, I, pp. 103-377. [505] Transition, in preparation for the concluding book (XIII), which undertakes a constructive resolution to the problem of the analysis of the mode of creation made here in Bk. XII. [506] This is a compound -- and untranslatable -- Latin pun: neque ut sic te colam quasi terram, ut sis uncultus si non te colam. [507] Cf. Enneads, I, 2:4: "What the soul now sees, it certainly always possessed, but as lying in the darkness. . . . To dispel the darkness and thus come to knowledge of its inner content, it must thrust toward the light." Compare the notions of the initiative of such movements in the soul in Plotinus and Augustine. [508] Cf. 2 Cor. 5:21. [509] Cf. Ps. 36:6 and see also Augustine's Exposition on the Psalms, XXXVI, 8, where he says that "the great preachers [receivers of God's illumination] are the mountains of God," for they first catch the light on their summits. The abyss he called "the depth of sin" into which the evil and unfaithful fall. [510] Cf. Timaeus, 29D-30A, "He [the Demiurge-Creator] was good: and in the good no jealousy . . . can ever arise. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself. . . . He took over all that is visible . . . and brought it from order to order, since he judged that order was in every way better" (F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, New York, 1937, p. 33). Cf. Enneads, V, 4:1, and Athanasius, On the Incarnation, III, 3. [511] Cf. Gen. 1:2. [512] Cf. Ps. 36:9. [513] In this passage in Genesis on the creation. [514] Cf. Gen. 1:6. [515] Rom. 5:5. [516] 1 Cor. 12:1. [517] Cf. Eph. 3:14, 19. [518] Cf. the Old Latin version of Ps. 123:5. [519] Cf. Eph. 5:8. [520] Cf. Ps. 31:20. [521] Cf. Ps. 9:13. [522] The Holy Spirit. [523] Canticum graduum. Psalms 119 to 133 as numbered in the Vulgate were regarded as a single series of ascending steps by which the soul moves up toward heaven; cf. The Exposition on the Psalms, loc. cit. [524] Tongues of fire, symbol of the descent of the Holy Spirit; cf. Acts 2:3, 4. [525] Cf. Ps. 122:6. [526] Ps. 122:1. [527] Cf. Ps. 23:6. [528] Gen. 1:3. [529] John 1:9. [530] Cf. the detailed analogy from self to Trinity in De Trinitate, IX-XII. [531] I.e., the Church. [532] Cf. Ps. 39:11. [533] Ps. 36:6. [534] Gen. 1:3 and Matt. 4:17; 3:2. [535] Cf. Ps. 42:5, 6. [536] Cf. Eph. 5:8. [537] Ps. 42:7. [538] Cf. 1 Cor. 3:1. [539] Cf. Phil. 3:13. [540] Cf. Ps. 42:1. [541] Ps. 42:2. [542] Cf. 2 Cor. 5:1-4. [543] Rom. 12:2. [544] 1 Cor. 14:20. [545] Gal. 3:1. [546] Eph. 4:8, 9. [547] Cf. Ps. 46:4. [548] Cf. John 3:29. [549] Cf. Rom. 8:23. [550] I.e., the Body of Christ. [551] 1 John 3:2. [552] Ps. 42:3. [553] Cf. Ps. 42:4. [554] Ps. 43:5. [555] Cf. Ps. 119:105. [556] Cf. Rom. 8:10. [557] Cf. S. of Sol. 2:17. [558] Cf. Ps. 5:3. [559] Ps. 43:5. [560] Cf. Rom. 8:11. [561] 1 Thess. 5:5. [562] Cf. Gen. 1:5. [563] Cf. Rom. 9:21. [564] Isa. 34:4. [565] Cf. Gen. 3:21. [566] Ps. 8:3. [567] "The heavens," i.e. the Scriptures. [568] Cf. Ps. 8:2. [569] Legunt, eligunt, diligunt. [570] Ps. 36:5. [571] Cf. Matt. 24:35. [572] Cf. Isa. 40:6-8. [573] Cf. 1 John 3:2. [574] Retia, literally "a net"; such as those used by retiarii, the gladiators who used nets to entangle their opponents. [575] Cf. S. of Sol. 1:3, 4. [576] 1 John 3:2. [577] Cf. Ps. 63:1. [578] Ps. 36:9. [579] Amaricantes, a figure which Augustine develops both in the Exposition of the Psalms and The City of God. Commenting on Ps. 65, Augustine says: "For the sea, by a figure, is used to indicate this world, with its bitter saltiness and troubled storms, where men with perverse and depraved appetites have become like fishes devouring one another." In The City of God, he speaks of the bitterness of life in the civitas terrena; cf. XIX, 5. [580] Cf. Ps. 95:5. [581] Cf. Gen. 1:10f. [582] In this way, Augustine sees an analogy between the good earth bearing its fruits and the ethical "fruit-bearing" of the Christian love of neighbor. [583] Cf. Ps. 85:11. [584] Cf. Gen. 1:14. [585] Cf. Isa. 58:7. [586] Cf. Phil. 2:15. [587] Cf. Gen. 1:19. [588] Cf. 2 Cor. 5:17. [589] Cf. Rom. 13:11, 12. [590] Ps. 65:11. [591] For this whole passage, cf. the parallel developed here with 1 Cor. 12:7-11. [592] In principio diei, an obvious echo to the Vulgate ut praesset diei of Gen. 1:16. Cf. Gibb and Montgomery, p. 424 (see Bibl.), for a comment on in principio diei and in principio noctis, below. [593] Sacramenta; but cf. Augustine's discussion of sacramenta in the Old Testament in the Exposition of the Psalms, LXXIV, 2: "The sacraments of the Old Testament promised a Saviour; the sacraments of the New Testament give salvation." [594] Cf. 1 Cor. 3:1; 2:6. [595] Isa. 1:16. [596] Isa. 1:17. [597] Isa. 1:18. [598] Cf. for this syntaxis, Matt. 19:16-22 and Ex. 20:13-16. [599] Cf. Matt. 6:21. [600] I.e., the rich young ruler. [601] Cf. Matt. 13:7. [602] Cf. Matt. 97 Reading here, with Knoll and the Sessorianus, in firmamento mundi. [603] Cf. Isa. 52:7. [604] Perfectorum. Is this a conscious use, in a Christian context, of the distinction he had known so well among the Manicheans -- between the perfecti and the auditores? [605] Ps. 19:2. [606] Cf. Acts 2:2, 3. [607] Cf. Matt. 5:14, 15. [608] Cf. Gen. 1:20. [609] Cf. Jer. 15:19. [610] Ps. 19:4. [611] That is, the Church. [612] An allegorical ideal type of the perfecti in the Church. [613] 1 Cor. 14:22. [614] The fish was an early Christian rebus for "Jesus Christ." The Greek word for fish, was arranged acrostically to make the phrase Jesus Christ, God?s Son, Saviour; cf. Smith and Cheetham, Dictionary of Christian Antiquities, pp. 673f.; see also Cabrol, Dictionnaire d'archeologie chretienne, Vol. 14, cols. 1246-1252, for a full account of the symbolism and pictures of early examples. [615] Cf. Ps. 69:32. [616] Cf. Rom. 12:2. [617] Cf. 1 Tim. 6:20. [618] Gal. 4:12. [619] Cf. Ecclus. 3:19. [620] Rom. 1:20. [621] Rom. 12:2. [622] Gen. 1:26. [623] Rom. 12:2 (mixed text). [624] Cf. 1 Cor. 2:15. [625] 1 Cor. 2:14. [626] Cf. Ps. 49:20. [627] Cf. James 4:11. [628] See above, Ch. XXI, 30. [629] I.e., the Church. [630] Cf. 1 Cor. 14:16. [631] Another reminder that, ideally, knowledge is immediate and direct. [632] Here, again, as in a coda, Augustine restates his central theme and motif in the whole of his "confessions": the primacy of God, His constant creativity, his mysterious, unwearied, unfrustrated redemptive love. All are summed up in this mystery of creation in which the purposes of God are announced and from which all Christian hope takes its premise. [633] That is, from basic and essentially simple ideas, they proliferate multiple -- and valid -- implications and corollaries. [634] Cf. Rom. 3:4. [635] Cf. Gen. 1:29, 30. [636] Cf. 2 Tim. 1:16. [637] 2 Tim. 4:16. [638] Cf. Ps. 19:4. [639] Phil. 4:10 (mixed text). [640] Phil. 4:11-13. [641] Phil. 4:14. [642] Phil. 4:15-17. [643] Phil. 4:17., [644] Cf. Matt. 10:41, 42. [645] Idiotae: there is some evidence that this term was used to designate pagans who had a nominal connection with the Christian community but had not formally enrolled as catechumens. See Th. Zahn in Neue kirkliche Zeitschrift (1899), pp. 42-43. [646] Gen. 1:31. [647] A reference to the Manichean cosmogony and similar dualistic doctrines of "creation." [648] 1 Cor. 2:11, 12. [649] Rom. 5:5. [650] Sed quod est, est. Note the variant text in Skutella, op. cit.: sed est, est. This is obviously an echo of the Vulgate Ex. 3:14: ego sum qui sum. [651] Augustine himself had misgivings about this passage. In the Retractations, he says that this statement was made "without due consideration." But he then adds, with great justice: "However, the point in question is very obscure" (res autem in abdito est valde); cf. Retract., 2:6. [652] See above, amaricantes, Ch. XVII, 20. [653] Cf. this requiescamus in te with the requiescat in te in Bk. I, Ch. I. [654] Cf. The City of God, XI, 10, on Augustine's notion that the world exists as a thought in the mind of God. [655] Another conscious connection between Bk. XIII and Bks. I-X. [656] This final ending is an antiphon to Bk. XII, Ch. I, 1 above.

Enchiridion On Faith, Hope, and Love

CHAPTER I The Occasion and Purpose of this "Manual" 1. I cannot say, my dearest son Laurence, how much your learning pleases me, and how much I desire that you should be wise -- though not one of those of whom it is said: "Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputant of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?"[1] Rather, you should be one of those of whom it is written, "The multitude of the wise is the health of the world"[2]; and also you should be the kind of man the apostle wishes those men to be to whom he said,[3] "I would have you be wise in goodness and simple in evil."[4] 2. Human wisdom consists in piety. This you have in the book of the saintly Job, for there he writes that Wisdom herself said to man, "Behold, piety is wisdom."[5] If, then, you ask what kind of piety she was speaking of, you will find it more distinctly designated by the Greek term qeosebeia, literally, "the service of God." The Greek has still another word for "piety," ensebeia, which also signifies "proper service." This too refers chiefly to the service of God. But no term is better than qeosebeia, which clearly expresses the idea of the man's service of God as the source of human wisdom. When you ask me to be brief, you do not expect me to speak of great issues in a few sentences, do you? Is not this rather what you desire: a brief summary or a short treatise on the proper mode of worshipping [serving] God? 3. If I should answer, "God should be worshipped in faith, hope, love," you would doubtless reply that this was shorter than you wished, and might then beg for a brief explication of what each of these three means: What should be believed, what should be hoped for, and what should be loved? If I should answer these questions, you would then have everything you asked for in your letter. If you have kept a copy of it, you can easily refer to it. If not, recall your questions as I discuss them. 4. It is your desire, as you wrote, to have from me a book, a sort of enchiridion,[6] as it might be called -- something to have "at hand" -- that deals with your questions. What is to be sought after above all else? What, in view of the divers heresies, is to be avoided above all else? How far does reason support religion; or what happens to reason when the issues involved concern faith alone; what is the beginning and end of our endeavor? What is the most comprehensive of all explanations? What is the certain and distinctive foundation of the catholic faith? You would have the answers to all these questions if you really understood what a man should believe, what he should hope for, and what he ought to love. For these are the chief things -- indeed, the only things -- to seek for in religion. He who turns away from them is either a complete stranger to the name of Christ or else he is a heretic. Things that arise in sensory experience, or that are analyzed by the intellect, may be demonstrated by the reason. But in matters that pass beyond the scope of the physical senses, which we have not settled by our own understanding, and cannot -- here we must believe, without hesitation, the witness of those men by whom the Scriptures (rightly called divine) were composed, men who were divinely aided in their senses and their minds to see and even to foresee the things about which they testify. [5]. But, as this faith, which works by love,[7] begins to penetrate the soul, it tends, through the vital power of goodness, to change into sight, so that the holy and perfect in heart catch glimpses of that ineffable beauty whose full vision is our highest happiness. Here, then, surely, is the answer to your question about the beginning and the end of our endeavor. We begin in faith, we are perfected in sight.[8] This likewise is the most comprehensive of all explanations. As for the certain and distinctive foundation of the catholic faith, it is Christ. "For other foundation," said the apostle, "can no man lay save that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus."[9] Nor should it be denied that this is the distinctive basis of the catholic faith, just because it appears that it is common to us and to certain heretics as well. For if we think carefully about the meaning of Christ, we shall see that among some of the heretics who wish to be called Christians, the _name_ of Christ is held in honor, but the reality itself is not among them. To make all this plain would take too long -- because we would then have to review all the heresies that have been, the ones that now exist, and those which could exist under the label "Christian," and we would have to show that what we have said of all is true of each of them. Such a discussion would take so many volumes as to make it seem endless.[10] 6. You have asked for an enchiridion, something you could carry around, not just baggage for your bookshelf. Therefore we may return to these three ways in which, as we said, God should be served: faith, hope, love. It is easy to _say_ what one ought to believe, what to hope for, and what to love. But to defend our doctrines against the calumnies of those who think differently is a more difficult and detailed task. If one is to have this wisdom, it is not enough just to put an enchiridion in the hand. It is also necessary that a great zeal be kindled in the heart.

CHAPTER II The Creed and the Lord's Prayer as Guides to the Interpretation of the Theological Virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love 7. Let us begin, for example, with the Symbol[11] and the Lord's Prayer. What is shorter to hear or to read? What is more easily memorized? Since through sin the human race stood grievously burdened by great misery and in deep need of mercy, a prophet, preaching of the time of God's grace, said, "And it shall be that all who invoke the Lord's name will be saved."[12] Thus, we have the Lord's Prayer. Later, the apostle, when he wished to commend this same grace, remembered this prophetic testimony and promptly added, "But how shall they invoke him in whom they have not believed?"[13] Thus, we have the Symbol. In these two we have the three theological virtues working together: faith believes; hope and love pray. Yet without faith nothing else is possible; thus faith prays too. This, then, is the meaning of the saying, "How shall they invoke him in whom they have not believed?" 8. Now, is it possible to hope for what we do not believe in? We can, of course, believe in something that we do not hope for. Who among the faithful does not believe in the punishment of the impious? Yet he does not hope for it, and whoever believes that such a punishment is threatening him and draws back in horror from it is more rightly said to fear than to hope. A poet, distinguishing between these two feelings, said, "Let those who dread be allowed to hope,"[14] but another poet, and a better one, did not put it rightly: "Here, if I could have hoped for [i.e., foreseen] such a grievous blow..." [15] Indeed, some grammarians use this as an example of inaccurate language and comment, "He said 'to hope' when he should have said 'to fear.'" Therefore faith may refer to evil things as well as to good, since we believe in both the good and evil. Yet faith is good, not evil. Moreover, faith refers to things past and present and future. For we believe that Christ died; this is a past event. We believe that he sitteth at the Father's right hand; this is present. We believe that he will come as our judge; this is future. Again, faith has to do with our own affairs and with those of others. For everyone believes, both about himself and other persons -- and about things as well -- that at some time he began to exist and that he has not existed forever. Thus, not only about men, but even about angels, we believe many things that have a bearing on religion. But hope deals only with good things, and only with those which lie in the future, and which pertain to the man who cherishes the hope. Since this is so, faith must be distinguished from hope: they are different terms and likewise different concepts. Yet faith and hope have this in common: they refer to what is not seen, whether this unseen is believed in or hoped for. Thus in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is used by the enlightened defenders of the catholic rule of faith, faith is said to be "the conviction of things not seen."[16] However, when a man maintains that neither words nor witnesses nor even arguments, but only the evidence of present experience, determine his faith, he still ought not to be called absurd or told, "You have seen; therefore you have not believed." For it does not follow that unless a thing is not seen it cannot be believed. Still it is better for us to use the term "faith," as we are taught in "the sacred eloquence,"[17] to refer to things not seen. And as for hope, the apostle says: "Hope that is seen is not hope. For if a man sees a thing, why does he hope for it? If, however, we hope for what we do not see, we then wait for it in patience."[18] When, therefore, our good is believed to be future, this is the same thing as hoping for it. What, then, shall I say of love, without which faith can do nothing? There can be no true hope without love. Indeed, as the apostle James says, "Even the demons believe and tremble."[19] Yet they neither hope nor love. Instead, believing as we do that what we hope for and love is coming to pass, they tremble. Therefore, the apostle Paul approves and commends the faith that works by love and that cannot exist without hope. Thus it is that love is not without hope, hope is not without love, and neither hope nor love are without faith.

CHAPTER III God the Creator of All; and the Goodness of All Creation 9. Wherefore, when it is asked what we ought to believe in matters of religion, the answer is not to be sought in the exploration of the nature of things [rerum natura], after the manner of those whom the Greeks called "physicists."[20] Nor should we be dismayed if Christians are ignorant about the properties and the number of the basic elements of nature, or about the motion, order, and deviations of the stars, the map of the heavens, the kinds and nature of animals, plants, stones, springs, rivers, and mountains; about the divisions of space and time, about the signs of impending storms, and the myriad other things which these "physicists" have come to understand, or think they have. For even these men, gifted with such superior insight, with their ardor in study and their abundant leisure, exploring some of these matters by human conjecture and others through historical inquiry, have not yet learned everything there is to know. For that matter, many of the things they are so proud to have discovered are more often matters of opinion than of verified knowledge. For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, whether in heaven or on earth, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and the true God.[21] Further, the Christian believes that nothing exists save God himself and what comes from him; and he believes that God is triune, i.e., the Father, and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same Father, but one and the same Spirit of the Father and the Son. 10. By this Trinity, supremely and equally and immutably good, were all things created. But they were not created supremely, equally, nor immutably good. Still, each single created thing is good, and taken as a whole they are very good, because together they constitute a universe of admirable beauty. 11. In this universe, even what is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, commends the good more eminently, since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when compared to the bad things. For the Omnipotent God, whom even the heathen acknowledge as the Supreme Power over all, would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil. What, after all, is anything we call evil except the privation of good? In animal bodies, for instance, sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of health. When a cure is effected, the evils which were present (i.e., the sickness and the wounds) do not retreat and go elsewhere. Rather, they simply do not exist any more. For such evil is not a substance; the wound or the disease is a defect of the bodily substance which, as a substance, is good. Evil, then, is an accident, i.e., a privation of that good which is called health. Thus, whatever defects there are in a soul are privations of a natural good. When a cure takes place, they are not transferred elsewhere but, since they are no longer present in the state of health, they no longer exist at all.[22]

CHAPTER IV The Problem of Evil 12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the Creator of all nature is supremely good. But nature is not supremely and immutably good as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created things can be diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still, however much it is diminished, something must remain of its original nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its "nature" cannot be destroyed without the thing itself being destroyed. There is good reason, therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise. When, however, a thing is corrupted, its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so much, a privation of the good. Where there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted, this will then be an incorruptible entity [natura incorruptibilis], and to this great good it will have come through the process of corruption. But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease having some good of which it cannot be further deprived. If, however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is no good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. Wherefore corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater good if it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good even when corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist. 13. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good. This leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, in so far as it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from something good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis natura bonum est]. Nothing evil exists _in itself_, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic judgment which reads: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the sweet bitter."[23] Moreover the Lord himself saith: "An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart."[24] What, then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity, what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked. Rather, he is a good entity in so far as he is a man, evil in so far as he is wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic judgment: "Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil." For this amounts to finding fault with God's work, because man is an entity of God's creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in this particular man _because_ he is a wicked person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective one, in so far as it is an entity, is good. In so far as it is defective, it is evil. 14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the rule of the logicians fails to apply.[25] No weather is both dark and bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. This principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil. For a man or an angel could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. These two contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is evil, then the evil simply could not be, since it can have no mode in which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than the deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not anything at all. There is no other source whence an evil thing can come to be. If this is the case, then, in so far as a thing is an entity, it is unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible entity, it is a great good. But even if it is a corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by corrupting something good can corruption inflict injury. 15. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not suppose that this denies our Lord's judgment: "A good tree cannot bear evil fruit."[26] This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth: "Men do not gather grapes from thorns," since thorns cannot bear grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we can see both vines and thorns spring up. Likewise, just as a bad tree does not grow good fruit, so also an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil could have arisen in the first place except from the nature -- good in itself -- of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord himself most clearly shows in the passage about the trees and the fruits, for he said: "Make the tree good and the fruits will be good, or make the tree bad and its fruits will be bad."[27] This is warning enough that bad fruit cannot grow on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet from that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts of trees can grow.

CHAPTER V The Kinds and Degrees of Error 16. This being the case, when that verse of Maro's gives us pleasure, "Happy is he who can understand the causes of things,"[28] it still does not follow that our felicity depends upon our knowing the causes of the great physical processes in the world, which are hidden in the secret maze of nature, "Whence earthquakes, whose force swells the sea to flood, so that they burst their bounds and then subside again,"[29] and other such things as this. But we ought to know the causes of good and evil in things, at least as far as men may do so in this life, filled as it is with errors and distress, in order to avoid these errors and distresses. We must always aim at that true felicity wherein misery does not distract, nor error mislead. If it is a good thing to understand the causes of physical motion, there is nothing of greater concern in these matters which we ought to understand than our own health. But when we are in ignorance of such things, we seek out a physician, who has seen how the secrets of heaven and earth still remain hidden from us, and what patience there must be in unknowing. 17. Although we should beware of error wherever possible, not only in great matters but in small ones as well, it is impossible not to be ignorant of many things. Yet it does not follow that one falls into error out of ignorance alone. If someone thinks he knows what he does not know, if he approves as true what is actually false, this then is error, in the proper sense of the term. Obviously, much depends on the question involved in the error, for in one and the same question one naturally prefers the instructed to the ignorant, the expert to the blunderer, and this with good reason. In a complex issue, however, as when one man knows one thing and another man knows something else, if the former knowledge is more useful and the latter is less useful or even harmful, who in this latter case would not prefer ignorance? There are some things, after all, that it is better not to know than to know. Likewise, there is sometimes profit in error -- but on a journey, not in morals.[30] This sort of thing happened to us once, when we mistook the way at a crossroads and did not go by the place where an armed gang of Donatists lay in wait to ambush us. We finally arrived at the place where we were going, but only by a roundabout way, and upon learning of the ambush, we were glad to have erred and gave thanks to God for our error. Who would doubt, in such a situation, that the erring traveler is better off than the unerring brigand? This perhaps explains the meaning of our finest poet, when he speaks for an unhappy lover: "When I saw [her] I was undone, and fatal error swept me away,"[31] for there is such a thing as a fortunate mistake which not only does no harm but actually does some good. But now for a more careful consideration of the truth in this business. To err means nothing more than to judge as true what is in fact false, and as false what is true. It means to be certain about the uncertain, uncertain about the certain, whether it be certainly true or certainly false. This sort of error in the mind is deforming and improper, since the fitting and proper thing would be to be able to say, in speech or judgment: "Yes, yes. No, no."[32] Actually, the wretched lives we lead come partly from this: that sometimes if they are not to be entirely lost, error is unavoidable. It is different in that higher life where Truth itself is the life of our souls, where none deceives and none is deceived. In this life men deceive and are deceived, and are actually worse off when they deceive by lying than when they are deceived by believing lies. Yet our rational mind shrinks from falsehood, and naturally avoids error as much as it can, so that even a deceiver is unwilling to be deceived by somebody else.[33] For the liar thinks he does not deceive himself and that he deceives only those who believe him. Indeed, he does not err in his lying, if he himself knows what the truth is. But he is deceived in this, that he supposes that his lie does no harm to himself, when actually every sin harms the one who commits it more that it does the one who suffers it.

CHAPTER VI The Problem of Lying 18. Here a most difficult and complex issue arises which I once dealt with in a large book, in response to the urgent question whether it is ever the duty of a righteous man to lie.[34] Some go so far as to contend that in cases concerning the worship of God or even the nature of God, it is sometimes a good and pious deed to speak falsely. It seems to me, however, that every lie is a sin, albeit there is a great difference depending on the intention and the topic of the lie. He does not sin as much who lies in the attempt to be helpful as the man who lies as a part of a deliberate wickedness. Nor does one who, by lying, sets a traveler on the wrong road do as much harm as one who, by a deceitful lie, perverts the way of a life. Obviously, no one should be adjudged a liar who speaks falsely what he sincerely supposes is the truth, since in his case he does not deceive but rather is deceived. Likewise, a man is not a liar, though he could be charged with rashness, when he incautiously accepts as true what is false. On the other hand, however, that man is a liar in his own conscience who speaks the truth supposing that it is a falsehood. For as far as his soul is concerned, since he did not say what he believed, he did not tell the truth, even though the truth did come out in what he said. Nor is a man to be cleared of the charge of lying whose mouth unknowingly speaks the truth while his conscious intention is to lie. If we do not consider the things spoken of, but only the intentions of the one speaking, he is the better man who unknowingly speaks falsely -- because he judges his statement to be true -- than the one who unknowingly speaks the truth while in his heart he is attempting to deceive. For the first man does not have one intention in his heart and another in his word, whereas the other, whatever be the facts in his statement, still "has one thought locked in his heart, another ready on his tongue,"[35] which is the very essence of lying. But when we do consider the things spoken of, it makes a great difference in what respect one is deceived or lies. To be deceived is a lesser evil than to lie, as far as a man's intentions are concerned. But it is far more tolerable that a man should lie about things not connected with religion than for one to be deceived in matters where faith and knowledge are prerequisite to the proper service of God. To illustrate what I mean by examples: If one man lies by saying that a dead man is alive, and another man, being deceived, believes that Christ will die again after some extended future period -- would it not be incomparably better to lie in the first case than to be deceived in the second? And would it not be a lesser evil to lead someone into the former error than to be led by someone into the latter? 19. In some things, then, we are deceived in great matters; in others, small. In some of them no harm is done; in others, even good results. It is a great evil for a man to be deceived so as not to believe what would lead him to life eternal, or what would lead to eternal death. But it is a small evil to be deceived by crediting a falsehood as the truth in a matter where one brings on himself some temporal setback which can then be turned to good use by being borne in faithful patience -- as for example, when someone judges a man to be good who is actually bad, and consequently has to suffer evil on his account. Or, take the man who believes a bad man to be good, yet suffers no harm at his hand. He is not badly deceived nor would the prophetic condemnation fall on him: "Woe to those who call evil good." For we should understand that this saying refers to the things in which men are evil and not to the men themselves. Hence, he who calls adultery a good thing may be rightly accused by the prophetic word. But if he calls a man good supposing him to be chaste and not knowing that he is an adulterer, such a man is not deceived in his doctrine of good and evil, but only as to the secrets of human conduct. He calls the man good on the basis of what he supposed him to be, and this is undoubtedly a good thing. Moreover, he calls adultery bad and chastity good. But he calls this particular man good in ignorance of the fact that he is an adulterer and not chaste. In similar fashion, if one escapes an injury through an error, as I mentioned before happened to me on that journey, there is even something good that accrues to a man through his mistakes. But when I say that in such a case a man may be deceived without suffering harm therefrom, or even may gain some benefit thereby, I am not saying that error is not a bad thing, nor that it is a positively good thing. I speak only of the evil which did not happen or the good which did happen, through the error, which was not caused by the error itself but which came out of it. Error, in itself and by itself, whether a great error in great matters or a small error in small affairs, is always a bad thing. For who, except in error, denies that it is bad to approve the false as though it were the truth, or to disapprove the truth as though it were falsehood, or to hold what is certain as if it were uncertain, or what is uncertain as if it were certain? It is one thing to judge a man good who is actually bad -- this is an error. It is quite another thing not to suffer harm from something evil if the wicked man whom we supposed to be good actually does nothing harmful to us. It is one thing to suppose that this particular road is the right one when it is not. It is quite another thing that, from this error -- which is a bad thing -- something good actually turns out, such as being saved from the onslaught of wicked men.